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THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS IN BRUSSELS 
Authors: David Coen University College London and Matia Vannoni University Bocconi  
Abstract 
This article explores the strategic management of government affairs in companies active in the 
European Union (EU). The article relies on a unique large-N dataset on the functioning and staffing 
of EU government affairs. The analysis shows that companies delegate government affairs 
functions to in-house managers with specific competences, who stay in office for long periods and 
who have an extensive knowledge of the core competences of the company, thanks to their 
educational background and work experience in the private sector. These findings suggest that 
how companies strategically manage and staff government affairs in Brussels rests on the distinct 
structure of business-government relations in the EU, which are based on the exchange of technical 
information and the establishment of credibility and long run trust arrangements. 
Keywords: Business and Government, Corporate Political Activity (CPA), Government affairs, 
Lobbying. 
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The number of firms politically active in the EU continues to grow and the political 
sophistication of their government affairs functions continues to evolve. Today, we see the 
development of specialized in-house government affairs departments, with an increasing number 
of professionals working there. The development of government affairs has been mainly studied 
in the public policy and management strands of literature as an organizational response to an 
increasing public involvement in the economic sphere. From a resource based perspective, scholars 
conceive of government affairs departments as an organizational resource indispensable to the 
company’s political activity. The literature is also aware that different institutional settings affect 
business-government relations and how firms adapt their resources to the context. 
Yet, the traditional focus on organizational resources overlooks the strategic management 
decisions taken by the company in the daily running of government affairs. This focus cannot 
explain, for instance, how companies delegate government affairs functions and to whom. In order 
to answer these questions, this article looks at how companies take strategic management 
decisions, in line with recent developments in the management literature (Lawton & Rajwani, 
2011; Lawton, Rajwani, et al., 2013). Drawing on a unique large-N dataset on the functioning and 
staffing of government affairs departments in companies active in the EU, findings show that 
companies delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences, 
who stay in place for long periods and possess a detailed knowledge of the core competences of 
the firm, thanks to their education and work background. This in turn depends on the specific 
business-government relations in place in the EU, which take the form of a trust based exchange 
of technical information.  
This work makes two contributions. At theoretical level, we explain micro strategic 
management decisions by looking at macro business and government relations. In so doing, we 
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bring together the scholarships of EU lobbying and management, which have traditionally, with 
few exceptions (Coen, 1997, 1998; Taminiau & Wilts, 2006), developed apart. By looking at how 
macro business-government relations affect the micro management of government affairs, this 
article opens the way to a comparative approach to the study of government affairs. Significantly, 
while a great deal of attention has been paid to how macro institutional differences affect the 
allocation of organizational resources in the traditional corporate political activity (CPA) literature 
and to how specific policy environments affect micro strategic management decisions in more 
recent works, little attention has been paid to how macro institutional differences affect strategic 
management decisions. At the empirical level, although recent studies already look at strategic 
management decisions, such as the organization of government affairs (Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; 
Lawton, Rajwani, et al., 2013), this work represents the first attempt to study this phenomenon 
from a large-N perspective.  
The Rise of Professional Government Affairs  
The 1970s witnessed an increase in CPA at the federal level in the US, with several large American 
companies establishing a permanent presence in Washington. Previously, CPA was reactive and 
on an ad hoc basis (Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985) and its main functions were carried out through 
personal contacts between businessmen and politicians (Martin, 1994; Vogel, 1978). The few 
offices or divisions established in Washington were primarily in charge of sales and marketing 
(Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985). However, in the 1970s we saw a steady increase in legislative 
activity at federal level (Martin, 1994; Wilson, 1990) and a more active approach of Presidents in 
incentivising business presence in Washington (Martin, 1994), coupled with a more partisan 
organization of the Congress and the rise of competing interests (Martin, 1994, 1995; Vogel, 1987; 
Vogel, 1996a; Vogel, 1996b). This led, between 1960 to 1980, to a five-fold increase in the number 
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of companies politically active in the capital, as well as in the size of the staff representing these 
companies (Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985). Hence, by 1990, most large American companies had 
established a permanent presence in the capital (Wilson, 1990). 
The increasing importance of individual action was coupled with the decreasing relevance 
of collective forms of action, such as membership of national business associations (Wilson, 1990) 
and, more importantly, with the development of in-house government affairs departments (Marcus 
& Kaufman, 1988; Martin, 1995; Post et al., 1983; Wilson, 1990; Yoffie, 1984). In the 1980s 
companies witnessed the creation of government affairs functions, separated from legal, public 
relations, finance and risk departments, and delegated to professional managers (Marx, 1986; 
Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985), in contrast to the activities of the 1960s (Cherington & Gillen, 1962; 
Miller & Johnson, 1970). As a result, the 1980s saw the emergence of a new professional way of 
organizing government affairs.  
The EU witnessed a similar trend a few decades later. In the EU, the creation of a 
supranational authority with increasing responsibilities (Coen & Richardson, 2009), along with an 
active campaign to encourage EU interest group activities by the European Commission and 
Parliament (Coen & Grant, 2000; Coen et al., 2010) and the rising presence of consumer, 
environmental and civil society interest groups (Greenwood, 2011), pulled business to Brussels. 
Today, over 500 companies engage in direct EU lobbying; this figure has grown from 
approximately 50 firms in the 1980s, to 200 in 1990s, 300 in the 2000s and 400 in the 2010s (Coen, 
2007, 2009; Greenwood, 2011; Wonka et al., 2010). 
 The increasing importance of an individual and permanent presence in Brussels furthered 
the development of professional government affairs functions (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2009; Coen, 
1997, 1998, 2007; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 1999; Kohler-Koch et al., 2013; Wilts & Quittkat, 
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2004). Since the mid-1980s, companies have allocated increasing resources to the establishment 
of government affairs departments in their headquarters, and these have often been complemented 
with offices in Brussels (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2009; Vannoni, 2015). Hence, by the mid-1990s, 
the majority of government affairs departments “had developed the strategic capacity to provide 
sophisticated peak level coordination over their subdivisions, cross-border holdings and 
subsidiaries” (Coen, 1998, p.80).  
However, information on the actual size and organization of government affairs offices has 
been scarce. In the 1990s and 2000s most EU offices were relatively small, with roughly five 
individuals employed (Coen, 1998; Greenwood, 2011). Nevertheless, it should be noted that this 
represented a large investment for firms, with the cost of an office with two full time employees 
in Brussels starting from 300,000 Euros per year in 2000 (CIPI, 2006), compared to less than a 
tenth of this sum for an annual subscription to a European business association (Greenwood, 2011).  
In our analysis, the dataset builds on the information gathered from the EU Transparency 
Register (CEC, 2014) and provides current information on the size of government affairs offices, 
with firms employing on average five officials in their government affairs offices.i A closer look 
at the data reveals that firms on average employ three full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members in 
these offices. Hence, this study captures something so far overlooked, namely the use of part-time 
work in government affairs offices. Furthermore, the study also presents new insights on the annual 
costs firms incur in engaging in government affairs. Specifically, we note that firms report 
spending on average almost 600,000 Euros a year on in-house government affairs activities, such 
as the running of the EU offices, but also in other government affairs activities, such as the 
organization of events and the hiring of consultancies. 
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The interviews conducted for this study confirm the increasing importance and 
professionalization of EU government affairs in companies. An experienced EU government 
affairs manager admitted that “at the beginning it was more a self-invented job”. ii Moreover, 
several interviewees observed that nowadays the role of government affairs is more appreciated 
within companies, iii especially in highly regulated sectors, where government affairs are seen as 
an insurance against political risks, but also as an investment in terms of political opportunities. iv  
The above section discussed how the study of government affairs evolved, namely as an 
organizational response to an increasing public involvement in the economic sphere, and that both 
the US and the EU witnessed the rise of professional government affairs. In the US, we observed 
during the 1980s the increasing legislative activity at federal level and concurrent increase in 
business and countervailing interest groups. Similarly, in the 1990s in the EU we saw how the 
supranational institutions, and the increasing number of single market directives, pulled both 
economic and societal interest groups in to Brussels in large numbers. These phenomena led to the 
rise of professional, but as we will note below, different government affairs functions.  
A Micro-level Approach to Government Affairs 
The study of government affairs as an organizational response to the involvement of the state in 
the economy does not fully explain how companies delegate government affairs functions and to 
whom. To do so, we propose a micro-level approach to CPA, which helps explain how companies 
take strategic management decisions in government affairs. 
Since the 1980s, management scholars have investigated what brings companies to the 
political arena, focusing on profits and the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs (Getz, 
2001). However, in the 1990s, attention shifted to the study of different types of CPA (Getz, 1997; 
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Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lord, 2000; Schuler et al., 2002; Shaffer, 1995) and the determinants of this 
choice, such as firm, industry, policy and national level factors (Keim & Baysinger, 1988; Shaffer, 
1995). One central avenue of study within CPA has been the development of government affairs 
functions (Yoffie, 1984; Yoffie, 1985; Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985) and recent work has sort to 
investigate the overall organizational structure of these offices (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 
2011; Martin, 1995) and the location of business-government relations within the corporate 
strategy of the firm (Baron, 1995; Hillman et al., 2009).  
One of the mainstream approaches to the study of CPA has been the resource dependence 
theory. By building on sociological studies (Getz, 2001), the resource dependence theory asserts 
that companies engage in a resource exchange with the public authority for access and influence 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013; McWilliams et al., 2002; Meznar & Nigh, 
1995). As such, recent CPA studies have recognized that to best understand political exchange we 
must understand the organizational structure, staffing and capacity of firms’ government offices, 
and, on the demand side, the differing institutional informational needs. Today professional 
government affairs departments are seen as paramount to a successful political strategy for a firm.  
Significantly, however, the main proponents of the management approach have noted that 
the study of CPA, and by extension the study of government affairs, has thus far lagged behind in 
developing a micro-level approach (Hillman et al., 2004; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000): “we believe 
that the CPA perspective needs to be further explored, from within individual government affairs 
functions” (p.99) (Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013). In the last 20 years, as noted by Foss (2011), 
the study of management shifted its focus to the firm level, and in recent years, to its processes 
and procedures, laying down the micro-foundations for the resource based theory (Barreto, 2010). 
This shift elicits two implications: the introduction of the concept of capabilities, as opposed to 
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resources, and a revamped attention on strategic management (Teece, 2007). First, by building on 
evolutionary economics (Gavetti, 2005), the literature started to look at routines and processes, in 
terms of individual behaviours rather than organizational resources (Teece, 2007; Wang & Barney, 
2006). Capabilities are defined as the organization’s capacity to more effectively use its resources 
in a particular environment (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). As a result, greater attention was paid to 
knowledge creation and to how the individual lies at its basis, for instance (Corredoira & 
Rosenkopf, 2010; Felin et al., 2012; Felin & Hesterly, 2007). Second, this extension of the resource 
based theory has assumed a strong strategic management connotation (Teece & Pisano, 1994). In 
fact, while the company cannot easily adapt its organizational resources to gain competitive 
advantage, it can adapt its capabilities by, for instance, delegating certain functions, creating 
certain positions within its structure and hiring individuals with certain skills and experience 
(Campbell et al., 2012; Wang & Barney, 2006). As such, the focus has been on human capital 
investments (Wang & Barney, 2006). For instance, Mäkelä et al. (2012) investigate the individual 
level determinants of capabilities in Human Resources (HR) in multinational corporations. Among 
other things, they focus on HR managers’ work experience, central in determining the level of 
strategic HR capabilities in the company (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Some recent studies look at CPA from a micro-level perspective (Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; 
Lawton, Rajwani, et al., 2013; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). The main focus is on the choice of the 
most effective strategies to influence public policy, given the specific policy environment in which 
the company acts. Different strategies, in turn, are supported by different internal and external 
capabilities (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Some of these studies focus on how, given the array of 
options of capabilities at hand, senior management makes a choice in specific policy contexts, 
looking also at the organization of government affairs (Lawton, Rajwani, et al., 2013). 
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This work advances this micro-level approach, by focusing on how macro business and 
government relations affect the allocation of capabilities at micro level. More specifically, we look 
at how the specific EU business and government relations affect the strategic decisions companies 
take in terms of the functioning and staffing of government affairs departments. The delegation of 
government affairs functions to a specific role and the hiring of managers with specific experience 
and skills are conceived of as capabilities. In turn these capabilities allow the company to better 
deploy its organizational resources to gain comparative advantage in the political arena. A micro-
level approach allows us to explain the differences in how companies manage government affairs. 
In fact, organizational resources, such as the development of professional government affairs 
functions, are arguably common to all political systems. Conversely, capabilities can be (and, 
indeed, are) easily adapted to the business-government relations in place in a particular system. 
Our theoretical contribution to the management literature is linking the macro business and 
government environment where companies are active with their micro strategic management 
choices. 
By building on the US experience, the following section formulates hypotheses regarding 
the strategic management of EU government affairs. The US literature has already looked at 
government affairs functions in detail, and has suggested a distinct set of business-government 
relations. In the following section, we seek to make sense of how these distinct US business-
government relations affect the strategic management of government affairs in Washington, and 
to understand what can be generalized. In this vein, we put forward hypotheses on how the distinct 
form of business-government relations in the EU affect the strategic management of government 
affairs in Brussels. 
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Government Affairs in the US 
The literature suggests that distinct US business-government relations are in place in Washington: 
companies exchange votes and funds with political actors in exchange for rent. Furthermore, the 
literature also looks at how government affairs functions are managed: companies make large use 
of external consultancies and hire managers with educational backgrounds in law or public 
relations, and work experience in the public sector, to deal with government affairs. Moreover, 
these managers tend to be appointed for short periods of time. By applying a micro-level approach 
to CPA, we suggest that these two aspects are correlated. Different business-government relations 
require different capabilities in government affairs, such as knowledge of the workings of the 
political and bureaucratic machines, and personal contacts. 
The American literature suggests that CPA in the US is rather adversarial (Mahoney, 2007; 
Vogel, 1978), being conceived as an economic transaction where firms provide the government 
with funds and votes in exchange for (regulatory) rent (Getz, 1997; Hillman et al., 2004; Keim, 
2001; Keim & Baysinger, 1988; Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013; Lord, 2000; Masters & Keim, 
1985). Exchange theories in the traditional US political science and political economy literatures 
are in line with management studies, arguing that with campaign contributions lobbyists buy 
support from key politicians (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1992, 1996; Stigler, 1971) or time from 
already sympathetic legislators (Denzau & Munger, 1986). Furthermore, it has been argued that in 
constituency based electoral systems, like the American one, business can exert influence on 
legislators due to its importance for the local economy, which in turn translates into a capacity to 
mobilize votes (Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Lindblom, 1977). Lastly, key differences are present 
between the public and the private sector in the US, in terms of employment conditions, which 
have significant effects on the relationship between business and government. Congressional staff 
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are subject to work conditions which are less advantageous than those in the private sector, in 
terms of remuneration, benefits and job security (Cain & Drutman, 2014), and Congressional staff 
have historically been subject to high levels of turnover (Che, 1995). 
As a result, US companies hire professional government affairs managers with unique 
knowledge of the political and bureaucratic machine and personal contacts in government. In the 
1950s and 1960s, representatives used to come from inside the company, whereas in the 1980s 
companies started to hire lawyers and public relations professionals with experience in government 
(Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985). First-hand experience in government and personal contacts there 
have been demonstrated to be key capabilities in influencing and gaining access to government 
(Bertrand et al., 2011; LaPira & Thomas, 2014). In fact, in Washington lobbyists tend to follow 
their contacts in the public sector when they are re-assigned to a different portfolio (Bertrand et 
al., 2011). The result is the well-documented phenomenon of the revolving door, with government 
affairs managers usually coming into the private sector from public service and political parties 
(Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Cain & Drutman, 2014; Che, 1995; Cohen, 1986; Gormley, 1979; 
LaPira & Thomas, 2014; Lazarus et al., 2016; Lazarus & McKay, 2012). Significantly, the high 
turnover in Congressional staff results in high turnover among government affairs managers and 
in-house lobbyists (LaPira & Thomas, 2014). For the same reasons, in the US companies make 
large use of external consultancies (LaPira & Thomas, 2014). 
In sum, distinct business-government relations require distinct capabilities in order for the 
company to maintain competitive advantage in the political arena. In the US, business-government 
relations are based on an exchange of votes or funds for rent. As such, companies hire government 
affairs managers with law/public relations educational backgrounds and work experience in the 
public sector, who have knowledge of how the political and bureaucratic machines work and who 
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have personal contacts there. Furthermore, these government affairs managers do not stay for long 
in that position and are often supported by external consultancies.  
Government Affairs in the EU 
By building on the US experience, this section looks at the business-government relations in place 
in the EU and formulates hypotheses on how these distinct relations affect the strategic 
management of government affairs in Brussels (i.e. the allocation of capabilities). In contrast to 
the US, business-government relations in the EU are based on the exchange of a specific currency: 
technical information. EU legislators are not dependent on business in terms of money and votes, 
since most of them are not directly elected and their legitimacy depends on the quality of regulation 
(Majone, 1997; Moravcsik, 2002). Even where direct elections are in place, such as for Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs), it has been demonstrated that EU citizens rarely vote on the 
basis of what MEPs do at the EU level (Hix & Marsh, 2007; Hobolt et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
funding to political parties in the European Parliament (EP) is mainly public and the EU has 
historically funded civil society organizations rather than the other way round (Mahoney, 2004; 
Mahoney & Beckstrand, 2011). What EU legislators need is high-quality technical information on 
the specific issues concerning a sector, which business is well placed to provide (Bouwen, 2002, 
2004). The literature suggests that this exchange of information does not take place as an economic 
transaction, but it is based on a network of trust and credibility (Broscheid & Coen, 2003; Coen, 
2007, 2009). EU institutions, especially the Commission, rely on the information exchanged with 
a relatively small inner circle of societal actors, among which business plays a central role 
(Bouwen, 2002, 2004). Access to this inner circle is based on trust and credibility. Societal actors 
are assessed on the basis of the information they send, and if they break the trust by sending biased 
information, they are excluded from this network (Broscheid & Coen, 2003, 2007). This network 
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of trust and credibility is reinforced by the fact that EU officials enjoy high benefits, long run 
permanent contracts and are subject to little turnover. As such, business must learn to work with 
the same government officials over time and build political reputation.  
Micro strategic management decisions refer to decisions concerning the allocation of 
political capabilities. Capabilities refer to processes and procedures, embedded in the organization 
of the firm, which allow the company to exploit its organizational resources, such as professional 
government affairs staff, in order to be more competitive in a specific macro business and 
government environment. In the EU, companies allocate capabilities in order to establish more 
effective long-term and trust-based relationships with their public counterpart and provide the 
latter with reliable technical information. We identify three capabilities: the delegation of 
government affairs, the type of appointment of government affairs managers and their skills. In 
the EU, those companies which delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with 
specific competences, who stay in office for long periods and who are able to provide EU 
institutions with technical knowledge of the industry, thanks to their educational and professional 
background, have a comparative advantage in the political arena. Table 1 summarizes the 
discussion. 
The first hypothesis is that companies active in the EU delegate government affairs to in-
house managers with specific competences. In these companies, government affairs functions are 
different from public relations or communications functions. Interviews show that the role of 
government affairs managers within companies is functionally differentiated from their colleagues 
in the legal, public relations, finance and risk departments and technical experts. This role is to 
coordinate between different national offices and make sure the firm speaks with a unified voice. 
As one interviewee noted, “they act as glue” in holding together a single perspective across 
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different departments and along the policy process. v The role of government affairs managers is 
to act as a bridge between the public authorities, in this case the EU, and the company. In so doing, 
they act as gate-keepers, controlling information from the inside out, but also from the outside in: 
they “lobby internally and externally”. vi In fact, they have to make sure that technical information 
is made understandable for decision-makers. As an interviewee observed, government affairs 
managers have to act as “kind of translators”. vii Yet, it should not be forgotten that information 
flows are not just out of the company, as government affairs managers are also in charge of 
managing information requests from the public authorities into the company. As stated by one of 
the interviewees: “I have become a sort of European agent spreading the European rules and 
approach inside my company”. viii  
Relatedly, it is expected that companies make little use of external consultancies. Indeed, 
external consultancies cannot help build long-term relations with decision-makers, based on 
mutual trust. This is suggested in several interviews, where it was noted that external consultancies 
are not regularly used. ix When used, it is mainly to monitor broad horizontal political issues, which 
affect the business environment as a whole, and not specifically to make representation for the 
company/sector. The reason is that the use of external consultancies fails to build a company’s 
reputation, or direct good will in the EU public policy realm. x In conclusion, companies politically 
active in the EU tend to delegate government affairs to in-house managers with specific functions 
and do not make large use of external consultancies. The reason is that in-house managers are 
functional in their relationships, seeking to maintain long-term relations with the public 
counterpart and establish trust both within the firm and outside it with EU institutions. 
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H1: Companies politically active in the EU tend to delegate government affairs to in-
house managers with specific functions and do not make large use of external 
consultancies 
The second hypothesis is that companies’ representatives need to provide some sort of 
continuity with respect to their counterparts in the EU institutions, who stay in the role for long 
periods. An EU government affairs manager interviewed for this study emphasised that the low 
turnover among EU officials impacts how they recruited individuals in government affairs 
offices.xi As such, government affairs managers tend to be appointed for long periods. 
H2: Companies politically active in the EU tend to delegate government affairs to 
managers appointed for long periods 
The last hypothesis concerns the skills managers need to possess. EU government affairs 
managers need to know how their industry works. These skills are usually acquired with work 
experience in the private sector. An education background in social science provides managers 
with highly transferrable skills, such as project management,xii which in turn can be complemented 
by the specific knowledge of an industry obtained in the field. Interviewees suggest that an 
education in social sciences might be the best starting point to become an EU government affairs 
manager. As put by one interview, “a degree in political science as a starter is probably one of the 
most useful things”. xiii Experience in the company’s core competences is then acquired in the 
field, through work experience. Indeed, EU government affairs managers need to be experts in the 
core competences of the company, but they also need to work in a political environment. This 
balance was emphasised by several interviewees. One interviewee asserted that people working in 
his department need to understand at least 60 per cent of the technical debates going on within the 
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firm and that if they understand less or more this means that they are working in the wrong 
department – this is what he calls the “60 per cent rule”.xiv  
H3: Companies politically active in the EU tend to delegate government affairs to 
managers with an educational background in social science and work experience in the 
private sector 
Table 1 below summarizes the main characteristics of the business and government relations 
in the EU and the US and how they affect the allocation of capabilities in government affairs. In 
the US business and government relations are mainly short term economic transactions based on 
the exchange of votes and funds. This arrangement requires a specific management of government 
affairs, based on external consultancies, high turnover within government affairs department and 
the focus on personal contacts. Conversely, in the EU business and government relations are long-
term trust based exchanges of information. This specific environment in turn requires the use of 
in-house managers who stay in place for long time and who know the industry. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
Research Design 
This article opens up the black box of government affairs departments, by exploring who is 
employed as government affairs managers in companies politically active in the EU and what their 
functions are. This study relies on a unique dataset containing information on 325 government 
affairs managers, identified from public and private directories, namely the 2014 DOD’s European 
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Government affairs Directory (DODs, 2014) and the EU Transparency Register (CEC, 2014). The 
Transparency Register (CEC, 2014) is close in spirit to the traditional lobbyists’ register, as can be 
found in several countries. Among other things, for each company registered it contains 
information on who is in charge of EU government affairs, under the entry ‘Person in Charge of 
EU Relations.’ The same information is available from the 2014 DOD’s European Public Affairs 
Directory, which provides a list of all the individuals in charge of in-house EU government affairs. 
These managers are employed in companies politically active in the EU from 32 countries, 
13 sectors and ranging from a size of few employees to hundreds of thousands. Information on the 
companies is gathered from AMADEUS (BureauVanDijk, 2014). Information on managers’ roles 
and their professional and educational background, namely where they had worked immediately 
before moving to the current company and where/what they studied at university, is drawn from 
the directories mentioned above and professional social networks, such as LinkedIn. This study 
also contains unique data on the political activities of the firm, presenting the size of the 
government affairs office, the lobbying expenses and the consultancies employed. This is drawn 
from the EU Transparency Register (CEC, 2014). As such, this work is the first large-N study of 
its kind.  
Finally, in-depth information on how government affairs departments work, their role within the 
firm, and who works there is gathered through elite interviews with 10 senior government affairs 
managers employed in a sample of companies from the dataset used in this work. A series of face-
to-face and telephone interviews were conducted in February and March 2016. The aim of these 
interviews was to validate the findings of the main analysis (Hochschild, 2009; Tansey, 2007). The 
sample used was non-probabilistic, based on snowballing (Davies, 2001), in order to give more 
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relevance to key actors (Tansey, 2007). Finally, interviews were semi-structured and lasted on 
average one hour (Harvey, 2011).  
Findings 
This section tests the hypotheses formulated above (see also Table 1). Our first hypothesis suggests 
that companies politically active in the EU tend to delegate government affairs to in-house 
managers with specific functions and do not make large use of external consultancies. We test this 
hypothesis first by looking at the competences of the managers in charge of EU public policy and 
then by looking at whether companies use private companies to further their interests. 
The findings show that almost half of the companies employ middle level and functionally 
specific roles, such as Director of (European) Government Affairs. In these companies, 
government affairs functions are differentiated from others, such as public relations, and are 
delegated to specific managers. Findings show also that almost half of the managers in the study 
have competences geographically specific to the EU or Europe. 
Nonetheless, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that some variation is present in the degree of 
differentiation and decentralization of government affairs functions. In some companies 
government affairs are dealt with by more senior managers, such as (deputy managing, executive 
or senior) director and (senior) vice president: these roles represent important management 
positions in the company, just below the president or the managing director. This variation in the 
delegation of government affairs can be explained by country and industry factors. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of senior and junior positions in charge of EU government affairs across country 
(the top-right quadrant considers whether the country is in the EU or not and the bottom-left 
quadrant groups countries according to families), firm size and industry. The findings suggest that 
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a statistically significant association is present between country and industry variables and the 
delegation of government affairs functions to junior or senior managers (with p<0.001). Figure 1 
shows that companies in highly regulated fields, such as transportation and telecommunications, 
employ more junior and functionally specialized managers in their government affairs 
departments. This is not surprising, as in these industries the need for corporate political activity 
is stronger than in others and as such companies employ managers with specific government affairs 
functions to deal with different regulation levels. In sectors where regulation is less prominent, 
companies delegate government affairs functions to senior managers with broad competences.  
Moreover, the findings suggest that although no difference is present between EU and non-
EU countries, there is a statistically significant relationship between the country of origin of the 
company and the delegation of government affairs functions to junior or senior managers (with 
p<0.001). Anglo-Saxon managers are more senior, while Continental companies show equal levels 
of senior and junior positions. Instead, Mediterranean countries show higher levels of junior 
managers. The tendency to delegate government affairs functions to key individuals might reflect 
the high importance of government affairs and lobbying in the Anglo-Saxon business culture. 
Conversely, in Continental and Mediterranean business cultures government affairs and lobbying 
have historically played a less central role and hence these functions are delegated to individuals 
in lower ranks.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------- 
20 
 
Some variation in terms of country and firm size is also present in the level of 
decentralization of government affairs. Figure 2 shows the percentage of managers with specific 
geographic competences (on the EU/Europe) across country, size and industry. First, where the 
headquarters of the firm are based affects how the firm organizes government affairs. The country 
of origin is statistically related to the geographic focus of government affairs managers (with 
p<0.05 for the variable EU and with p<0.001 for the variable Country Group). Firms outside the 
EU tend to appoint managers to deal specifically with the EU institutions, as shown in the top right 
quadrant of Figure 2. Furthermore, the distance from Brussels appears to matter, for instance 
Belgian and Dutch firms do not differentiate government affairs functions geographically, whereas 
Spanish firms do – as shown in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 2. These findings may be due 
to the need to establish a permanent presence in Brussels: companies in the EU and especially 
companies close to Brussels already have the organizational resources to deal with EU institutions 
effectively, whereas companies with headquarters outside the EU, or simply far from Brussels, 
need to create specific roles and functions on purpose. Second, the top left quadrant of Figure 2 
demonstrates that the size of the company matters. Firm size is statistically related to the 
geographic focus of government affairs managers (with p<0.001). Small firms tend not to have 
developed corporate governance structures with distinct departments in charge of government 
affairs. In fact, in small firms government affairs are less developed and they appoint a single 
individual to deal with different regulatory arenas. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------- 
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Most companies politically active in the EU delegate government affairs functions to roles 
which are separated from public relations and communications roles and which deal specifically 
with the EU, or the European region at least. Although some important variation across firm, 
industry and country level is present, this finding provides support for the first hypothesis set out 
above. 
 The first hypothesis also concerns the use of external consultancies. Indeed, it is expected 
that companies politically active in the EU delegate government affairs functions to in-house 
managers with specific functions, which is demonstrated above, but also that they do not make 
extensive use of external consultancies.  
The findings suggest that the use of external consultancies is limited, and to a certain extent 
complementary to, rather than a substitute for, in-house government affairs. Slightly more than 
half of the firms in the dataset regularly hire public and government affairs consultancies: a figure 
which pales in comparison with the situation in the US, where the hiring of private lobbyists and 
external consultants is common practice (LaPira & Thomas, 2014). Moreover, the findings show 
that the use of external consultants and the size of the public in-house affairs office are correlated 
(with p<0.001). Again, this supports our expectation that in the EU mutual trust in business-
government relations is created through long-term interactions between public officials and 
company representatives. The use of external consultancies is not a capability which can create 
comparative advantage in this scenario and rather, can be detrimental. It is reasonable to assume 
that external consultancies are used only to complement corporate political activity through in-
house government affairs. 
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The second hypothesis concerns the type of appointment of the government affairs 
managers. As government affairs functions take place in an environment where companies need 
to establish long-term relations based on trust, with public officials in place for long periods, it is 
expected that companies delegate government affairs functions to managers who stay in place for 
long periods as well.  
The managers in the sample show high levels of longevity, having on average spent six years 
in their positions, and some as many as ten years. No statistically significant variation is found 
between longevity and firm, industry and country level factors. This supports our expectation that 
since in the EU business-government relations are based on mutual trust, which in turn require 
time to create, government affairs managers stay in their roles for long periods, and are able to 
create social capital in the EU institutions and within the company itself. This is reinforced by the 
fact that EU officials have long-term contracts and stay in charge of a single portfolio for long 
periods, as noted above, and hence companies need to mirror these dynamics. 
The last hypothesis set out above is that government affairs in the EU rely on specific skills, 
namely in-depth knowledge of the core competences of the firm. In order to regulate different 
policy areas, EU institutions need timely technical information from companies. This is key in EU 
business-government relations. Accordingly, managers need to have specific scientific knowledge, 
which can come from education or work experience. As already emphasised in micro-capability 
approaches applied to other fields (Zollo & Winter, 2002), the work experience of key employees 
is crucial to determine the level of strategic capabilities 
 The findings show that more than a third of the managers in the study are educated (in their 
first degree) in social sciences. Languages, law and humanities feature less prominently. 
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Moreover, very few managers have first degrees in business and management, or professional 
education. The situation is rather different for the second degree though, where managers holding 
a management and business degree (i.e. executive education) are prominent. An apparent pattern 
seems to be present in this case, with EU managers as highly qualified individuals, with a 
traditional secondary education in social sciences, followed by an executive qualification.  
Some variation is present across countries, industries and firm size, as shown in Figure 3. 
This variation might be explained by different national business cultures, and by the fact that some 
industries deal with more technical products or services than others (as suggested above), and 
hence managers in these industries need a more technical education. Moreover, it is reasonable to 
assume that in small companies senior managers with general educations are in charge of different 
functions, including government affairs. 
Figure 4 shows the professional background of EU government affairs managers across firm 
size, country and industry. The findings show that the professional background of government 
affairs managers is mainly in the private sector, with few of them having experience also in public 
affairs companies and law firms. No statistically significant variation is present across firm size 
and countries. Mild variation is present only across industries, which might be explained by the 
fact that some industries are more technical than others and as such, in those industries technical 
knowledge is particularly important. Finally, it should be noted that very few EU government 
affairs managers have work experience in the public sector, which contrasts starkly with the US. 
As seen above, in the US business-government relations the political currency is the knowledge of 
the political machine and personal contacts, while in the EU these factors matter less. As such, 
little personnel exchange between the public and the private sector is present. This is in line with 
recent work which suggests that Brussels is characterised by a system closer in spirit to sliding 
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doors than revolving doors, where there is a neat separation between private and public careers 
(Coen & Vannoni, 2016). 
Findings about the educational and professional background of EU government affairs 
managers support the last hypothesis set out above. In the EU the political currency is technical 
information and in order to provide EU institutions with this currency, companies adopt specific 
capabilities, such as hiring individuals with technical knowledge of the core competences of the 
firm. This technical knowledge is usually acquired in the field, namely with work experience in 
the private sector.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------- 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
----------------------- 
This final part provides further confirmation for the first hypothesis above, by exploiting 
variation in the level of political activity across companies. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that 
the level political activity in the EU is associated with the extent to which companies delegate 
government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences. Table 2 and Table 
3 show the results of multivariate logistic regression models with the outcome variable specified 
as whether the government affairs manager in the firm has competences geographically specific to 
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the EU or Europe, and with lobbying costs and the size of the government office as indicators for 
the level of political activity in the EU, respectively. The findings suggest that the more a company 
invests in corporate political activity in the EU (by allocating more resources, in terms of money 
and people), the more it will delegate to decentralized in-house government affairs managers. 
These findings are robust also when controlling for the size of the company, as well as the country 
and industry of the company. 
The multivariate regression analysis provides further confirmation for the first hypothesis 
formulated above, adding validity to the results in this article. Results for control variables are also 
consistent with the bivariate analysis above. Indeed, the level of decentralization of government 
affairs is associated with the country of origin of the firm, as suggested above. Table 1 and Table 
2 show that whether a company comes from outside the EU, or even far from Brussels, such as 
Scandinavian countries, this company is more likely to have a government affairs manager with 
specific competences for Europe or the EU. These results are robust also when controlling for 
other factors, most notably firm size. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------- 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------- 
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Overall, the findings support the hypotheses formulated above. Companies politically active 
in the EU delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences, 
who stay in place for long periods and who have technical knowledge of the core competences of 
the firm, thanks to their education and professional background. This is arguably due to the distinct 
structure of business-government relations in the EU, where companies exchange technical 
information with EU institutions and where mutual trust plays a crucial role. Companies 
strategically manage government affairs by delegating specific functions and appointing 
individuals with specific skills to carry out these functions, in order to obtain a comparative 
advantage in the political arena. 
Conclusion 
By looking at the strategic management of government affairs, this article applies a micro-level 
approach to the study of CPA in the EU. This approach moves the attention from organizational 
resources, such as the development of professional government affairs, to the allocation of 
capabilities at the micro-level, such as the allocation of human capital with determined skills and 
functions in charge of government affairs. Our main theoretical contribution is looking at how the 
strategic management of government affairs at the micro level varies according to the macro 
business-government relationships, which in turn provides the opportunity for more systematic 
comparative analysis.  
In the US it has been demonstrated that corporate political activity can be seen as an 
economic transaction between business and government. The most valuable political resource is 
unique access to key decision-makers. As such, we observe a great deal of traffic through revolving 
doors as companies seek to hire managers with work experience in the public sector. The lobbying 
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industry is therefore characterized by former politicians and bureaucrats running government 
affairs offices and is subject to high turnover. 
This article, drawing on an original large-N dataset, shows that companies politically active 
in the EU delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences, 
who are appointed for long periods and have in-depth knowledge of the sector. The reason lies in 
the distinct EU institutional arrangements and the business-government relations. In Brussels, 
where the credibility of the policy relies on the quality of the information, the most valuable 
currency is technical information and knowledge of the market, and as such companies hire 
managers with experience of the sector and credibility within the company acquired over time. In 
sum, for the business-government relations to work in Brussels there must be trust and credibility 
between EU officials and company representatives based on experience and understanding of the 
regulatory issues.  
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Table 1. Business-Government Relations and the Strategic Management of Government Affairs in 
the US and EU 
 US EU 
Business-government 
Relations 
  
Logic Economic transaction Trust-based relationship 
Currency Votes and funds Technical information 
Time Horizon Short-term Long-term 
   
Strategic Management of 
Government Affairs 
  
Delegation External In-house 
Appointment High turnover High longevity 
Skillset Personal contacts and 
knowledge of the political 
machine 
 
Knowledge of the industry 
Work experience Work experience in the public 
sector 
Work experience in the 
private sector 
Education 
background 
Law and public relations Social sciences  
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Figure 1. Differentiation of Government Affairs: Senior and Junior Positions of Government 
Affairs across Firm Size, Country and Industry 
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Figure 2. Decentralization of Government Affairs: Geographical Representation of Government 
Affairs across Firm Size, Country and Industry 
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Figure 3. Government Affairs Managers’ Education Background across Firm Size, Country and 
Industry 
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Figure 4. Government Affairs Managers’ Professional Background across Firm Size, Country and 
Industry 
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Table 2. Multivariate Regression Analysis: Decentralization of Government Affairs and Lobbying 
Spending 
 Decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbying Spending - High 0.942*** 0.937*** 1.014*** 
 (0.324) (0.326) (0.352) 
Firm Size - Small  -0.265 -0.002 
  (0.492) (0.518) 
Country - Continental   0.204 
   (0.386) 
Country - Mediterranean   0.431 
   (0.574) 
Country - non European   1.644
*** 
   (0.512) 
Country - Scandinavian   1.459
** 
   (0.663) 
Industry - Information   0.075 
   (0.698) 
Industry - Manufacturing   -0.034 
   (0.473) 
Industry - Other   0.057 
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   (0.507) 
Industry - Professional   -0.195 
   (0.477) 
Industry - Wholesale   -0.241 
   (0.631) 
Constant 0.075 0.085 -0.426 
 (0.158) (0.164) (0.502) 
Observations 224 222 218 
Log Likelihood -147.838 -146.723 -135.179 
Note: *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
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Table 3. Multivariate Regression Analysis: Decentralization of Government Affairs and 
Government Office Size 
 Decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Government Office Size 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.162*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) 
Firm Size - Small  -0.274 0.015 
  (0.468) (0.498) 
Country - Continental   0.269 
   (0.369) 
Country - Mediterranean   0.179 
   (0.559) 
Country - non European   1.594
*** 
   (0.491) 
Country - Scandinavian   1.398
** 
   (0.648) 
Industry - Information   0.178 
   (0.667) 
Industry - Manufacturing   0.030 
   (0.461) 
Industry - Other   -0.045 
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   (0.490) 
Industry - Professional   -0.178 
   (0.460) 
Industry - Wholesale   -0.573 
   (0.603) 
Constant -0.108 -0.103 -0.577 
 (0.206) (0.209) (0.493) 
Observations 242 240 236 
Log Likelihood -160.119 -158.838 -146.731 
Note: *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
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i Information on the dataset is provided below. 
ii I001, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
iii I009, London, 22 June 2016. 
iv I007, Brussels, 3 March 2016. 
v I007, Brussels, 3 March 2016. 
vi I007, Brussels, 3 March 2016. 
vii I006, Brussels, 16 February 2016. 
viii I001, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
ix I009, London, 22 June 2016. 
x I002, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
xi I009, London, 22 June 2016. 
xii I008, Brussels, 3 March 2016. 
xiii I001, Brussels, 3 February 2016. 
xiv I002, Brussels, 15 February 2016. 
                                                          
